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Abstract
This paper develops a Bayesian approach for assessing equivalence and non-
inferiority hypotheses in two-arm trials using relative belief ratios. A relative
belief ratio is a measure of statistical evidence and can indicate evidence
either for or against a hypothesis. In addition to the relative belief ratio,
we also compute a measure of the strength of this evidence as a calibration
of the relative belief ratio. Furthermore, we make use of the relative belief
ratio as a measure of evidence, to assess whether a given prior induces bias
either for or against a hypothesis. Prior elicitation, model checking and
checking for prior-data conflict procedures are developed to ensure that the
choices of model and prior made are relevant to the specific application.
We highlight the applicability of the approach and illustrate the proposed
method by applying it to a data set obtained from a two-arm clinical trial.
Key words and phrases: equivalence, noninferiority, relative belief ratios,
statistical evidence, bias induced from a prior, model checking and checking
for prior-data conflict.
1 Introduction
Recently, hypothesis testing has been an active research topic in various
types of two-arm clinical trials. As an example, a clinician may want to
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demonstrate whether a new treatment is not worse than that of a reference
treatment (also known as active control or standard treatment) by more
than a specified margin [1]. This helps in assessing whether a less toxic,
easier to administer, or less expensive treatment, is medically noninferior to
a reference treatment. This kind of clinical trial, where the intention is to
demonstrate that the new treatment is not inferior to the standard treat-
ment by more than a small predefined margin δ, is known as a noninferiority
trial. Here δ > 0 is known as the prespecified clinically irrelevant or non-
inferiority margin. Two-arm noninferiority trials of a new treatment and a
well established reference treatment are an attractive option as in certain
settings they avoid exposing patients to placebo situations. There has been
a series of articles on this topic; see for example, special issues of Statistics
in Medicine (Volume 47, Issue 1, 2005) and Journal of Biopharmaceutical
Statistics (Volume 14, Number 2, 2004).
Sometimes in clinical trials, the goal is not to show that the new treat-
ment is better, but rather equivalent to the reference treatment. This kind
of clinical trial is known as an equivalence trial [2]. In an equivalence trial,
the aim is to show that new treatment and the reference treatment have
equal efficacy. For practical purposes, one can select a margin δ such that
two treatments can be considered not to differ when their true difference
lies in the interval of clinical equivalence (−δ, δ). Note that this is different
from testing a difference between two treatments which is a two-sided test
known as superiority test in clinical literature. In this case δ > 0 is called
the clinically equivalence margin. Note that in either case, δ must be defined
a priori.
There is a considerable literature on the related problems of hypothesis
tests in clinical trials. As a simple frequentist method, one can use the
standard t test for testing these hypotheses. At a higher level a generalized
p-value approach may be applied using a generalized test function [3]. One
can also perform tests using the ratio of the averages instead of the difference
between the averages [4, 5]. Bayesian non-inferiority tests for proportions
in two-arm trials with a binary primary endpoint [6] and normal means [7]
are also considered in recent literature.
This paper considers a novel Bayesian approach for assessing a hypoth-
esis in two-arm trials using relative belief ratios. A relative belief ratio for a
hypothesized value of a parameter of interest is interpreted as the evidence
that the hypothesized value is correct. We may obtain evidence either for
or against the hypothesized value. Associated with a relative belief ratio is
a measure of the strength of this evidence and this may be weak, strong or
inconclusive. General inferences based on relative belief ratios are developed
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in [8, 9, 10].
We discuss relative belief ratios and associated theory in Section 2 and
illustrate this by application to the problem of interest. In Section 3 we
consider the elicitation of the prior and how we can measure the suitability
of the prior both with respect to its agreement with what the data say and
with respect to measuring the bias a prior puts into the analysis. In Section
4, the approach is applied to a data set obtained from a two-arm clinical
trial. We conclude with a short discussion in Section 5.
2 Inferences Based on Relative Belief Ratios
Suppose we have a statistical model, as given by a collection of densities
{fθ : θ ∈ Θ}, and a prior pi on Θ. After observing data x, the posterior
distribution of θ is given by the density
pi(θ |x) =
pi(θ)fθ(x)
m(x)
where m(x) =
∫
Θ pi(θ)fθ(x) dθ. For an arbitrary parameter of interest ψ =
Ψ(θ) we denote the prior and posterior densities of ψ by piΨ and piΨ(· |x),
respectively. The relative belief ratio for a hypothesized value ψ0 of ψ is
defined by
RBΨ(ψ0) =
piΨ(ψ0 |x)
piΨ(ψ0)
, (1)
the ratio of the posterior to the prior at ψ0. As such, RBΨ(ψ0) is measur-
ing how beliefs have changed that ψ0 is the true value from a priori to a
posteriori. Considering the case when the prior for ψ is discrete, we have
that RBΨ(ψ0) > 1 means that the data have lead to an increase in the
probability that ψ0 is correct, and so we have evidence in favor of ψ0, while
RBΨ(ψ0) < 1 means that the data have lead to a decrease in the proba-
bility that ψ0 is correct, and so we have evidence against ψ0. As discussed
in [10], this interpretation is also appropriate in the continuous case via a
consideration of limits.
Clearly relative belief ratios are similar to Bayes factors, as they are both
measuring change in belief, but the Bayes factor does this by comparing pos-
terior to prior odds while the relative belief ratio compares posterior to prior
probabilities and so is somewhat simpler. In fact, in certain circumstances
the relative belief ratio and Bayes factor can be considered as equivalent
but this is not always true. The full relationship between these quantities is
discussed in [10].
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One problem that both the relative belief ratio and the Bayes factor
share as measures of evidence, is that it is not clear how they should be
calibrated. Certainly the bigger RBΨ(ψ0) is than 1, the more evidence we
have in favor of ψ0 while the smaller RBΨ(ψ0) is than 1, the more evidence
we have against ψ0. But what exactly does a value of RBΨ(ψ0) = 20 mean?
It would appear to be strong evidence in favor of ψ0 because beliefs have
increased by a factor of 20 after seeing the data. But what if other values of
ψ had even larger increases? While calibrations of Bayes factors have been
suggested [11, 12, 13] the proposed scales seem arbitrary and it is not at all
clear that there is a universal scale on which Bayes factors or relative belief
ratios can be calibrated.
A more useful calibration of (1) is given by
ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0) |x) (2)
which is the posterior probability that the true value of ψ has a relative
belief ratio no greater than that of the hypothesized value ψ0. If we interpret
RBΨ(ψ0) as the measure of the evidence that ψ0 is the true value, we see
that (2) is the posterior probability that the true value has evidence no
greater than that for ψ0.
While (2) may look like a p-value, we see that it has a very different
interpretation. For when RBΨ(ψ0) < 1, so we have evidence against ψ0,
then a small value for (2) indicates a large posterior probability that the true
value has a relative belief ratio greater than RBΨ(ψ0) and so we have strong
evidence against ψ0. If RBΨ(ψ0) > 1, so we have evidence in favor of ψ0,
then a large value for (2) indicates a small posterior probability that the true
value has a relative belief ratio greater than RBΨ(ψ0) and so we have strong
evidence in favor of ψ0. Notice that in the set {ψ : RBΨ(ψ) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0)}, the
‘best’ estimate of the true value is given by ψ0 simply because the evidence
for this value is the largest in this set. Various results have been established
in [10] supporting both (1), as the measure of the evidence and (2), as the
strength of that evidence.
As a measure of the strength of the evidence, (2) seems to work best when
the posterior probabilities for all the possible values of ψ are all small or even
0 as in the continuous case. When some of these values have large posterior
probabilities we can augment (2) as follows. If the prior piΨ corresponds to
a discrete distribution with piΨ(ψ0) > 0, we have that
piΨ(ψ0 |x) ≤ ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0) |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0). (3)
The right-hand inequality holds generally, see [10], while the left-hand in-
equality requires discreteness. Suppose piΨ(ψ0 |x) and (2) are both small
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and notice that this happens whenever RBΨ(ψ0) is small. In this case we
clearly have strong evidence against ψ0 when RBΨ(ψ0) < 1 and weak ev-
idence for ψ0 when RBΨ(ψ0) > 1. Also, when piΨ(ψ0 |x) and (2) are both
big, then we have only weak evidence against ψ0 when RBΨ(ψ0) < 1 and
strong evidence for ψ0 when RBΨ(ψ0) > 1.
The other possibility is that the posterior probability piΨ(ψ0 |x) is small
and (2) is big. If the prior probability piΨ(ψ0) is big and RBΨ(ψ0) < 1,
then this suggests that we have indeed obtained strong evidence against ψ0
because (2) is big only because there are many other values of ψ for which
there is evidence against ψ at least as strong as the evidence against ψ0.
If, however piΨ(ψ0) is small and RBΨ(ψ0) < 1, then we have weak evidence
against ψ0 because piΨ(ψ0 |x) is small due to piΨ(ψ0) being small. When
piΨ(ψ0) is big and RBΨ(ψ0) > 1, then we must have piΨ(ψ0 |x) is big as well,
so no ambiguity arises, while when piΨ(ψ0) is small, then again piΨ(ψ0 |x) is
small due to piΨ(ψ0) being small and so in both situations we have strong
evidence in favor of ψ0 via (2). So the only context where (2) might not
suffice as a measure of the strength of the evidence given by RBΨ(ψ0), is
when ψ has a discrete prior distribution with piΨ(ψ0) a non-neglible size,
piΨ(ψ0 |x) small and (2) big. In general there is no harm in the discrete case
in quoting (2), piΨ(ψ0 |x) and piΨ(ψ0), as part of the analysis of the strength
of the evidence given by RBΨ(ψ0) and we recommend this.
There is another issue associated with using RBΨ(ψ0) to assess the ev-
idence that ψ0 is the true value. One of the key concerns with Bayesian
inference methods is that the choice of the prior can bias the analysis in var-
ious ways. For example, in many problems Bayes factors and relative belief
ratios can be made arbitrarily large by choosing the prior to be increasingly
diffuse. This phenomenon is known as the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox because
a diffuse prior is supposed to represent less information.
An approach to dealing with this paradox is discussed in [10]. Given
that we accept that RBΨ(ψ0) is the evidence that ψ0 is true, the solution is
to measure a priori whether or not the chosen prior induces bias either for
or against ψ0. To see how to do this we note first the Savage-Dickey result,
see [14] and [10], which says that
RBΨ(ψ0) =
m(x |ψ0)
m(x)
(4)
where
m(x |ψ0) =
∫
{θ:Ψ(θ)=ψ0}
pi(θ |ψ0)fθ(x) dθ
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is the prior-predictive density of the data x given that Ψ(θ) = ψ0. Actually,
it is easy to see that, if T (x) is a minimal sufficient statistic for the full
model, then m(x |ψ0)/m(x) = mT (T (x) |ψ0)/mT (T (x)) where mT is the
prior predictive density of T and mT (· |ψ0) is the prior predictive density of
T given that Ψ(θ) = ψ0.
From (4) we can measure the bias in the evidence against ψ0 by com-
puting
MT
(
mT (t |ψ0)
mT (t)
< 1
∣∣∣∣ ψ0
)
(5)
as this is the prior probability that we will obtain evidence against ψ0 when
ψ0 is true. So when (5) is large we have bias against ψ0. To measure the bias
in favor of ψ0 we choose values ψ
′
0 6= ψ0 such that the difference between ψ0
and ψ′0 represents the smallest difference of practical importance. We then
compute
MT
(
mT (t |ψ0)
mT (t)
> 1
∣∣∣∣ ψ′0
)
(6)
as this is the prior probability that we will obtain evidence in favor of ψ0
when ψ0 is false. Again, when (6) is large we have bias in favor of ψ0. Note
that both (5) and (6) decrease with sample size and so, in design situations,
they can be used to set sample size and so control bias.
When we are not able to control sample size, then (5) and (6) can be
computed and used to qualify any conclusions we reach about whether ψ0
is true or not. For example, if we have evidence against ψ0 and (5) is large,
this has to be taken with a ‘grain of salt’ as our choices have biased things
this way. We draw a similar conclusion if we have evidence in favor of ψ0
and (6) is large. Of course, these negative conclusions could also lead us to
redo the analysis using a prior that does not induce such biases when this
is possible, see Section 3.
A variety of other inferences can be derived from interpreting RBΨ(ψ)
as the evidence that ψ is the true value. For example, the best estimate of
ψ is clearly the value for which the evidence is greatest, namely,
ψLRSE(x) = arg supRBΨ(ψ),
and called the least relative surprise estimator in [8, 9, 10]. Associated with
this is a γ-credible region
Cγ(x) = {ψ : RBΨ(ψ) ≥ cγ(x)} (7)
where
cγ(x) = inf{k : ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ) ≥ k |x) ≤ γ}.
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Notice that ψLRSE(x) ∈ Cγ(x) for every γ ∈ [0, 1] and so, for selected γ,
we can take the size of Cγ(x) as a measure of the accuracy of the estimate
ψLRSE(x). Given the interpretation of RBΨ(ψ) as the evidence for ψ, we
are forced to use the sets Cγ(x) for our credible regions. For if ψ1 is in such
a region and RBΨ(ψ2) ≥ RBΨ(ψ1), then we must put ψ2 into the region as
well as we have at least as much evidence for ψ2 as for ψ1.
In [8, 9, 10] various optimality properties are established for ψLRSE(x)
and the regions Cγ(x) in the class of all Bayesian inferences. One notable
property is that inferences based on the relative belief ratio are invariant
under reparameterizations. This is not the case for Bayesian inferences
based on losses, such as the posterior mean or mode and highest probability
density regions.
We now consider the application of relative belief inferences to two-arm
trials.
Example Two-arm Trials.
Let xE = (xE,1, . . . , xE,nE) denote the sample from the experimental
treatment and xR = (xR,1, . . . , xR,nR) denote the sample from the reference
treatment. We assume that these responses are mutually independent with
xE,i ∼ N(µE , σ
2) and xR,i ∼ N(µR, σ
2) where µE , µR ∈ R
1 and σ2 > 0 are
all unknown. The information in the data is summarized by the minimal
sufficient statistic T (xE, xR) = (x¯E , x¯R, s
2) where s2 = [(nE − 1)s
2
E + (nR−
1)s2R]/(nE + nR − 2) and the likelihood equals
σ−nE−nR exp{−
[
nE(x¯E − µE)
2 + nR(x¯R − µR)
2 + (nE + nR − 2)s
2
]
/2σ2}.
We will use the prior for (µE , µR, σ
2) given by
µE |σ
2 ∼ N(µ0, τ
2
0σ
2),
µR |σ
2 ∼ N(µ0, τ
2
0σ
2),
1/σ2 ∼ Gamma(α0, β0). (8)
We will discuss elicitation of the hyperparameters µ0, τ
2
0 , α0 and β0 in Section
3. The posterior distribution of (µE , µR, σ
2) is then easily obtained and is
given by
µE |xE , xR, σ
2 ∼ N
(
nEx¯E + µ0/τ
2
0
nE + 1/τ
2
0
,
σ2
nE + 1/τ
2
0
)
,
µR |xE , xR, σ
2 ∼ N
(
nRx¯R + µ0/τ
2
0
nR + 1/τ20
,
σ2
nR + 1/τ20
)
,
1/σ2|xE , xR ∼ Gamma
(
nE + nR + 2α0
2
,
2β0 + (nE + nR − 2)s
2
2
)
. (9)
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Note that it is simple to generate values from (8) and (9).
Now suppose we want to assess the hypothesis that the true value of
µE − µR satisfies |µE − µR| < δ. So δ represents a practically meaningful
difference between the means. If the difference is less than this quantity,
then we do not distinguish between µE and µR but otherwise we do. It
makes sense then that, if µE and µR do differ, we would want to know
how many units of δ these means differed by. So for the ψ parameter of
interest in this problem we will consider ψ ∈ Z where ψ = i indicates that
µE − µR ∈ ((2i − 1)δ, (2i + 1)δ]. So the hypothesis of interest corresponds to
H0 : ψ = 0.
To calculate the relative belief ratios for values of ψ we need the prior
and posterior distributions of this parameter. These quantities are obtained
by discretizing the prior and posterior distributions of µE − µR. We have
that the marginal prior distribution of µE − µR is given by
(µE − µR)/τ0
√
β0
α0
∼ t2α0 (10)
and the marginal posterior distribution of µE − µR is given by
{(µE − µR)− (x¯E − x¯R)}/sp
√
1/nE + 1/nR |xE, xR ∼ tν (11)
where ν = nE + nR + 2α0 − 4 and
s2p =
2β0 + (nE + nR − 2)s
2
nE + nR + 2α0 − 4
.
When ν is large, the posterior distribution is approximately normal, while
it has heavy tails when ν is small.
So to assess H0 the evidence is given by
RBΨ(0) =
Π((−δ, δ] |xE , xR)
Π((−δ, δ])
=
Π((−δ, δ] | x¯E , x¯R, s
2)
Π((−δ, δ])
(12)
and the strength of the evidence is given by
ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0) |xE , xR)
= Π(∪RBΨ(i)≤RBΨ(0)((2i − 1)δ, (2i + 1)δ] |xE , xR)
=
∑
i:RBΨ(i)≤RBΨ(0)
Π({((2i − 1)δ, (2i + 1)δ] |xE , xR). (13)
Both (12) and (13) are easily evaluated using the exact distribution theory
given for the prior and posterior distribution of µE − µR. For example, we
can use the t distribution function routine in the R software package.
8
Suppose that we obtain RBΨ(0) < 1 and that (13) indicates that this
is reasonably strong evidence against H0. From the tabulation of RBΨ(i),
that we computed as part of calculating (13), we easily obtain the optimal
estimate of ψ, namely,
ψLRSE(xE , xR) = arg supRB(i).
If ψLRSE(xE , xR) is greater than 0, then we have a clear indication that
the experimental treatment is better than the reference treatment. The
accuracy of the estimate is assessed by computing the 0.95-relative belief
region
C0.95(xE , xR) = {i : RB(i) ≥ c0.95(xE , xR)}
and seeing how large it is. We can convert this into a region for µE − µR
via
C∗0.95(xE , xR) =
⋃
i∈C0.95(xE ,xR)
((2i− 1)δ, (2i + 1)δ].
To assess the bias in the prior we have to compute (5) and (6). From
(10) and (11) we can evaluate
RBΨ(0) =
Π((−δ, δ] |xE , xR)
Π((−δ, δ])
=
mT (x¯E , x¯R, s
2 | − δ < µE − µR ≤ δ)
mT (x¯E , x¯R, s2)
and note that RBΨ(0) depends on the data only through (x¯E − x¯R, s
2). We
then need only simulate from the conditional prior predictive of (x¯E−x¯R, s
2)
given that ψ is the true value. Note that, given (µE − µR, σ
2) then
x¯E − x¯R ∼ N(µE − µR, (1/nE + 1/nR)σ
2),
(nE + nR − 2)s
2/σ2 ∼ Chi-squared(nE + nR − 2) (14)
and these quantities are independent.
We can compute (5) by the following simulation process:
1. set a counter C = 0,
2. generate σ2 using (8),
3. generate µE − µR froma N(0, 2τ
2
0 σ
2) distribution conditioned to
−δ < µE − µR ≤ δ,
4. generate (x¯E − x¯R, s
2) using (14),
5. compute RBΨ(0) and add 1 to C if it is less than 1,
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6. repeat 2-4 N times and record C/N as the estimate of (5).
Essentially the same simulation can be carried out to evaluate (6) with step
2 changing, as we condition on (2i− 1)δ < µE − µR ≤ (2i+ 1)δ for say i = 1
or i = −1, and in step 4 we check if RBΨ(0) is greater than 1.
The only slightly difficult part in this simulation is step 3 and for that
we can use an inversion algorithm. For denoting the cdf and inverse cdf of
a N(0, 1) distribution by Φ and Φ−1, respectively, we generate µE − µR in
step 3, when conditioning on (2i − 1)δ < µE − µR ≤ (2i + 1)δ, by generating
u ∼ U(0, 1) and putting
µE − µR = Φ
−1(Φ((2i − 1)δ) + [Φ((2i+ 1)δ)−Φ((2i− 1)δ)]u). (15)
We can use routines in R for Φ and Φ−1 to evaluate (15).
3 Choosing and Checking the Ingredients
In any statistical analysis a statistician chooses a model that supposedly de-
scribes the generation of the data and, in a Bayesian analysis, also chooses
a prior. As the analysis is typically highly dependent on these subjective
choices, it is important that they be checked against what is typically ob-
jective, at least if it is collected correctly, namely, the data.
3.1 Checking the Model
For the model this entails asking if the observed data is surprising for every
distribution in the model. If this is the case, then we conclude that there is
a problem with the model and need to somehow modify this. While there
are often many model checking procedures available, for the problem under
study we will use the Shapiro-Wilks test based on the residuals from the
model. We note that this check is, as it should be, completely independent
of the choice of prior as we do not want to confound our considerations of
the adequacy of the model and the prior.
3.2 Eliciting the Prior
Before discussing how we check the prior, we first consider the choice of the
prior. For this we need only consider eliciting the prior for µ and σ2 in a
N(µ, σ2) distribution. So we need to specify the hyperparameters µ0, τ
2
0 , α0
and β0. This is based on knowledge of the measurement process that leads to
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the actual data and will typically require knowledge from someone familiar
with making these kinds of measurements.
To elicit the prior for µ we specify an interval (m1,m2) that we are
virtually certain (probability = 0.999) will contain this quantity. Of course
we choose this as short as possible without being unrealistic. We then set
µ0 = (m1 +m2)/2 and since
0.999 = Φ
(
m2 − µ0
τ0σ
)
− Φ
(
m1 − µ0
τ0σ
)
= 2Φ
(
m2 −m1
2τ0σ
)
− 1
we have that
σ2 ≤ ((m2 −m1)/2)
2 {Φ−1 ((1 + 0.999)/2)}−2 τ−20 . (16)
An interval that contains virtually all of the actual data measurements is
given by µ± σΦ−1 ((1 + 0.999)/2) . Since this interval cannot be unrealisti-
cally too short or too long, we let s1 and s2 be lower and upper bounds on
the half-length of the interval so that
s21 ≤ σ
2
{
Φ−1 ((1 + 0.999)/2)
}2
≤ s22. (17)
Then equating the upper bound on σ2 in (16) with the upper bound on σ2
obtained from (17), we have
τ20 = ((m2 −m1)/2)
2 s−22 .
This determines the hyperparameters in the conditional prior for µ.
From (17) we have that
s−22
{
Φ−1 ((1 + 0.999)/2)
}2
≤ 1/σ2 ≤ s−21
{
Φ−1 ((1 + 0.999)/2)
}2
. (18)
Suppose again we want to determine the lower and upper bounds in (18)
so that this interval contains 1/σ2 with virtual certainty. Therefore, letting
G(α0, β0, ·) denote the Gamma(α0, β0) cdf we see that
G−1(α0, β0, (1 + 0.999)/2) = s
−2
1
{
Φ−1 ((1 + 0.999)/2)
}2
G−1(α0, β0, (1 − 0.999)/2) = s
−2
2
{
Φ−1 ((1 + 0.999)/2)
}2
(19)
and we solve (19) for α0 and β0 by iteration. Noting that G(α0, β0, x) =
G(α0, 1, β0x), and using the monotonicity of the cdf, leads to a simple iter-
ative process.
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So specifying the hyperparameters for (8) requires specifying an interval
(m1,m2) that contains the true values of µE and µR with virtual certainty
and also specifying the constants s1, s2 that specify lower and upper bounds
on the length of any interval that will contain any measurement with virtual
certainty. Of course, virtually certainty need not mean with probability
0.999 as some other large probability can be chosen. This value could be
viewed as a conservative choice.
3.3 Checking the Prior
Checking the prior involves asking if the true value is a surprising value
with respect to the prior. Methods for checking the prior in this sense are
developed in [15, 17, 18]. Note that this is quite different than checking
whether or not a prior induces bias as discussed in Section 2. A prior can
avoid conflict with the data by being diffuse but at the same time induce
bias into the analysis. Selecting a suitable prior involves balancing these
considerations and tools have been developed for this.
The methods developed for checking the prior allows for all aspects of
the prior to be checked simultaneously or for checking separate aspects of
the prior in sequential fashion. The latter typically makes the most sense
because, if we do detect prior-data conflict, then we will be better able to
pinpoint where the problem lies.
The basic method for checking the prior involves computing, where T is
the minimal sufficient statistic, the probability
MT (mT (t) ≤ mT (T (x))) (20)
as this serves to locate the observed value T (x) in its prior distribution. If
(20) is small, then T (x) lies in a region of low prior probability, such as a
tail or anti-mode, which indicates a conflict. In the continuous case (20)
is not invariant under 1-1 smooth transformations of the minimal sufficient
statistic. Accordingly, (20) was modified in [16] to
MT
(
mT (t)/JT (T
−1(t)) ≤ mT (T (x))/JT (x
)
), (21)
where JT (x) = (det dT (x)(dT (x))
t)−1/2 and dT (x) is the Jacobian matrix
of T, to produce an invariant measure of prior-data conflict.
It is shown in [18] that, under quite general conditions, both (20) and
(21) converge to Π(pi(θ) ≤ pi(θtrue)), as the amount of data increases, where
θtrue is the true value of the parameter. If Π(pi(θ) ≤ pi(θtrue)) is small, then
θtrue lies in a region of low prior probability which implies that the prior is
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not appropriate. A logical approach to modifying a prior to avoid a conflict,
when this is detected, is developed in [17].
For the prior given by (8) we will check this sequentially. First we will
check the prior on σ2 and, if no prior-data conflict is found, we then proceed
to check the joint prior on (µE, µR). For this we follow [15] which prescribes
that the check on the prior for σ2 is based on the prior predictive distribution
of s2. Given σ2, we have that V = (nE + nR − 2)s
2/σ2 ∼Chi-squared(nE +
nR − 2) and, as developed in the Appendix, a simple calculation gives that
the prior predictive distribution is V ∼ ((nE + nR− 2)/α0)β0F ((nE +nR−
2)/2, 2α0). Letting mV denote the density of V and following [16, 18] an
invariant p-value that checks the prior for σ2 is given by
MV (mV (v)v
1/2 ≤ mV ((nE + nR − 2)s
2)(nE + nR − 2)
1/2s) (22)
and this is easily computed via simulation.
If the prior for σ2 has passed its check, then we can proceed to check the
joint prior for (µE, µR) and this is based on the prior predictive distribution
of U = (x¯E , x¯R). Given σ
2 we have that
U ∼ N2
(
µ0
(
1
1
)
, σ2
(
τ20 + 1/nE 0
0 τ20 + 1/nR
))
and an easy calculation presented in the Appendix gives that the prior pre-
dictive distribution is
U ∼ t2α0
(
2, µ0
(
1
1
)
, (β0/α0)
(
τ20 + 1/nE 0
0 τ20 + 1/nR
))
.
Denoting the prior predictive density of U by mU , we check the joint prior
for (µE , µR) via the p-value
MU (mU (u) ≤ mU (x¯E , x¯R)) (23)
and this is easily computed using simulation. As discussed in [16, 18] this
p-value is invariant because (x¯E , x¯R) is a linear function of the data.
4 Example
We illustrate the approach described in Sections 2 and 3 using a data set
published in [2]. The data come from a comparative trial of moxonodin
and captopril in the antihypertensive treatment of patients suffering from
major depression. The response variable is the reduction of diastolic blood
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Figure 1: Quantile plots of experimental and reference treatment groups.
pressure, measured in millimeters of mercury (mm Hg), of patients suffer-
ing from a major depression under two drugs captopril (experimental) and
moxonodin (reference). The data is given by
xE = (3.3, 17.7, 6.7, 11.1,−5.8, 6.9, 5.8, 3.0, 6.0, 3.5, 18.7, 9.6)
xR = (10.3, 11.3, 2.0,−6.1, 6.2, 6.8, 3.7,−3.3,−3.6,−3.5, 13.7, 12.6)
so nE = nR = 12. The minimal sufficient statistic of the data is T (xE , xR) =
(x¯E , x¯R, s
2) = (7.21, 4.17, 46.79). We suppose that a practically meaningful
difference in the means is given by δ = 0.5 mm Hg.
Figure 1 gives the Q-Q plots of the residuals. The Shapiro-Wilks test for
normality applied to the residuals gives a p-value of 0.51. This indicates that
the data is not inconsistent with the normality assumption with constant
variance.
For prior elicitation, we initially propose to reflect vague knowledge
about the parameters by choosing a very diffuse prior. The values m1 =
−100,m2 = 100, s
2
1 = 5 and s
2
2 = 1000 lead to the hyperparameter values
µ0 = 0, τ
2
0 = 10, α0 ≈ 2, β0 ≈ 5.
The bias in this prior is assessed by computing (4) and (5) with ψ0 = 0. We
found that
MT (mT (t | 0)/mT (t) < 1 | ψ = 0) = 0.07,
14
indicating that there is very little bias against ψ0. We see, however, that
MT (mT (t | 0)/mT (t) > 1 | ψ = 1) = 0.774
and this indicates that we have considerable bias in favor of ψ0. This is
undoubtedly because we have chosen the prior to be too diffuse. Using such
a prior will lead us to overstate the evidence in favor of the hypothesis or
equivalently, understate the evidence against.
So to avoid the bias as much as possible, we chose different values for the
hyperparameters. For this we set m1 = −20,m2 = 20, s
2
1 = 10 and s
2
2 = 600
which lead to the hyperparameter values
µ0 = 0, τ
2
0 = 0.67, α0 ≈ 1, β0 ≈ 8.
In this case we get
MT (mT (t | 0)/mT (t) < 1 | ψ = 0) = 0.49,
MT (mT (t | 0)/mT (t) > 1 | ψ = 1) = 0.40
indicating that there is some bias both for and against the hypothesis with
this choice of prior. We cannot expect to be able to get both of these values
to be low as this is controlled by sample size and we do not have a lot of
data.
We checked this prior using (22) and (23). The value 0.15 was obtained
for (22) and the value 0.22 obtained for (23). This indicates that there is no
reason to be concerned about prior-data conflict.
Figure 2 contains a plot of the posterior and relative belief ratio for
the continuous parameter. For the discretized parameter ψ we obtained
RBΨ(0) = 0.515 with a strength of 0.19. As such we have only moderately
strong evidence against the hypothesis of equivalence. Also
ψLRSE(xE , xR) = arg supRBΨ(ψ) = 7
and the 0.95-relative belief region is given by
C∗0.95(xE , xR) = (−0.5, 13.5].
The length of this interval indicates a fair degree of uncertainty about the
true value but we do have reasonable evidence that the treatments are not
equivalent.
Note that C∗0.95(xE , xR) includes the value 0 but this is not a contra-
diction with the fact that we have evidence against ψ = 0. These credible
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Figure 2: Plots of prior (- - -) and posterior (—) densities and of the relative
belief ratio (—) of ψ.
regions do not work like confidence intervals do with p-values. It is only
the length of C∗0.95(xE , xR) that is relevant as a measure of the accuracy of
the estimate ψLRSE(xE , xR). It is easily deduced from (7), and as discussed
in [10], that there is a relationship between relative belief regions and the
strength of the evidence (2). This makes sense as both are measuring the
accuracy or reliability of inferences based on the measure of evidence as
given by the relative belief ratio.
We investigated the choice of many other priors. The results were fairly
consistent in obtaining evidence against ψ = 0 and with similar strengths.
The biases did vary considerably with sometimes there being very low bias
against ψ = 0 but accompanied by high bias in favor or conversely. Inter-
estingly, such extreme cases are often accompanied by prior-data conflict.
Alternatively, we could assess the hypothesis of noninferiority, namely,
H0 : ψ ∈ (−δ,∞) for which Π((−δ,∞)) = 0.58 and Π((−δ,∞) |xE , xR) =
0.89. Therefore,
RBΨ((−δ,∞)) =
Π((−δ,∞) |xE , xR)
Π((−δ,∞))
=
0.89
0.58
= 1.53
indicates evidence in favor of H0 being true. Since the posterior probability
of H0 is large, this indicates strong evidence in favor of the experimental
treatment being at least as effective as the reference treatment.
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5 Conclusions
We have considered the application of relative belief inferences to an impor-
tant inference problem with two-arm clinical trials. This is seen to provide a
clear definition of what the evidence is, whether in favor of or against, for a
hypothesis. Moreover, with such a definition this allows us to assess the bias
introduced into a statistical analysis by a proper prior and so addresses a
key concern with the use of Bayesian inference methods. In addition we have
provided a methodology for eliciting an appropriate prior in such a context
and demonstrated how one checks this prior to see if it is contradicted by
the data.
In general, we take the view that all of statistics is subjective as we
choose sampling models and priors and possibly even choose other ingredi-
ents. Such subjectivity is always present in a statistical analysis. Rather
than searching for methods that are supposedly ‘objective’ in some sense,
we embrace the subjectivity as allowing us to make judgements that reflect
additional information we have about the application. Once the model and
prior are chosen, we can go forward and make inference, based on the mea-
sure of statistical evidence and its calibration, in an unambiguous way. If
we want these inferences to be convincing, however, it is important that we
check the ingredients chosen against that aspect of the analysis that can
best be claimed to be objective, namely, the data. So model checking and
checking for prior-data conflict are essential parts of any statistical analysis.
The analysis in this paper is presented as a meaningful application of this
approach to statistical analyses.
6 Appendix
In Section 3.3 the prior predictive density of V = (nE + nR − 2)s
2 is
mV (v) =
∫ ∞
0
(v/σ2)(nE+nR−2)/2−1 exp{−v/2σ2}
2(nE+nR−2)/2Γ((nE + nR − 2)/2)
(1/σ2)α0
βα00 Γ(α0)
×
exp{−β0/σ
2} d(1/σ2)
=
Γ((nE + nR − 2 + 2α0)/2)
Γ(α0)Γ((nE + nR − 2)/2)
(
v
2β0
)(nE+nR−2)/2−1
×
(
1 +
v
2β0
)−(nE+nR−2)/2−α0 1
2β0
.
Suppose U = (U1, U2) |σ
2 ∼ N2(µ, σ
2Σ) where σ2 is distributed as in
17
(8). Then the marginal density of U is
mU (u) =
∫ ∞
0
(2pi)−1(detΣ)−1/2 exp{−(u− µ)′Σ−1(u− µ)/2σ2}
(1/σ2)α0
βα00 Γ(α0)
×
exp{−β0/σ
2} d(1/σ2)
=
Γ(α0 + 1)
Γ2(1/2)Γ(α0)
(det Σ)−1/2(1 + (u− µ)′Σ−1(u− µ)/2β0)
−(α0+1)β−10
which is the density of a t2α0(2, µ, (β0/α0)Σ) distribution.
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